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Abstract
We study the impact of environmental disclosure on the idiosyncratic risk
of European manufacturing firms. Utilizing a panel data set of 288 firms
from 17 European countries during the period from 2005 to 2016, we provide
evidence that environmental disclosure reduces idiosyncratic risk of invest-
ment. Our findings show that this relationship can best be justified by the
stakeholder and the legitimacy theories. By contrast, predictions based on
managerial opportunism appear to be unsupported by our data. In addition,
results reveal that the effect of environmental disclosure on idiosyncratic risk
varies significantly across the conditional distribution of idiosyncratic risk.
Results remain robust under three different econometric methods; namely,
(i) panel data techniques, (ii) dynamic panel data and (iii) quantile regres-
sions.
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1 Introduction
For the past several years, great consideration has been given to economic implica-
tions of corporate environmental responsibility, not only by companies’ stakehold-
ers including investors, managers, suppliers and employees, but also by researchers
(Zhang, 2017). Importantly, the disclosure of environmental information is cru-
cial for shaping future actions of regulators (Qiu et al., 2016). Particularly, in an
attempt to monitor rising temperatures, the European Parliament has underlined
the importance of corporate environmental disclosure for identifying sustainability
risks and for helping to increase both investors’ and consumers’ trust (EU Commis-
sion., 2014). Reporting transparent environmental information not only mitigates
information asymmetries, but also helps to create an informative network within
society, which is crucial for dealing with climate change (Stern, 2007; Aggarwal
and Dow, 2012; IPCC, 2014). In this paper, we add to the discussion on climate
change by examining whether the disclosure of environmentally sensitive informa-
tion by European manufacturing firms is conducive to less risky investments in the
stock market.
Environmental disclosure1 is the information pertaining to environmental per-
formance that is publicly disclosed by firms (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Luo et al.,
2012; Matsumura et al., 2014). Transparent environmental information has the
potential to appease investors’ expectations because firms signal their smooth
transition to the new climate era (Benlemlih et al., 2018). In turn, from the
investors’ point of view, this signalling can have important implications not only
for the financial performance of the firms but also for the financial risk (King and
Lenox, 2001; Endrikat et al., 2014; Misani and Pogutz, 2015). Therefore, asking
whether disclosure of such information reduces financial risk of investment is of
paramount importance for a company’s stakeholders, financial regulators, policy-
makers and researchers. To be more explicit, the risk of financial investment can be
decomposed into the systematic and idiosyncratic components. In this study, we
concentrate on the latter because it is shaped by firm-specific characteristics and
is driven by corporate policy. Making the right corporate decisions should dimin-
ish idiosyncratic risk. In retrospect, given the importance of idiosyncratic risk for
investment decision making (e.g., Merton, 1987; Ang et al., 2006; Lin et al., 2014),
this study investigates whether environmental disclosure affects idiosyncratic risk.
The effects of environmental disclosure on the risk of financial investment is
founded on a complex theoretical framework (Brooks and Oikonomou, 2017). On
the one hand, environmental disclosure promotes a strategy that values environ-
mental issues. Thus, investors might be attracted by firms that commit to disclos-
1One example of transparent environmental disclosure is when firms report greenhouse gases,
energy consumption, renewable energy consumption and total waste.
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ing environmentally-sensitive information and are more likely to benefit from lower
financial risk (Jiang et al., 2009; Molina-Azorin et al., 2009), as predicted by both
the legitimacy and the stakeholder theories. On the other hand, environmental dis-
closure can be detrimental (Friedman, 1970; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) because
firms are exposed to not necessarily fair criticism and high pollution-abatement
costs (Wagner et al., 2002; Lee et al., 2015), as managerial opportunism advocates.
In this regard, we investigate whether different levels of idiosyncratic risk affect
both the strength and the sign of this relationship across firms.
Empirical studies conducted over the years have substantially improved our
knowledge about the effects of environmental disclosure on firm performance.
These studies imply that disclosure in general decreases the information asym-
metries between firms and investors and thus it is negatively related to financial
risk (Ferreira and Laux, 2007; Benlemlih et al., 2018; Qiu et al., 2016). However,
information about climate change typically conveys a negative tone, and investors
might be sceptical concerning “green” future investment decisions (Cormier and
Magnan, 2015). This is apparent from the body of research that examines the rela-
tionship between environmental and financial performance, and reports inconclu-
sive results. For instance, meta-analytic papers (Horvathova, 2010; Dixon-Fowler
et al., 2013; Albertini, 2013; Endrikat et al., 2014) suggest that the controversy
of the results is attributed to intense endogeneity. This endogeneity arises either
because (i) the independent variable (i.e. environmental performance) correlates
with the random disturbance term in the regression model, or (ii) there is simul-
taneous causality between financial and environmental performance, or (iii) the
regression model is suffering from an omitted variable bias (Delmas et al., 2015;
Misani and Pogutz, 2015; Nollet et al., 2016; Trumpp and Guenther, 2017; Brooks
and Oikonomou, 2017). It should also be noted that while the aforementioned
studies examine this relationship by utilizing profitability measures (e.g., ROA,
ROE, Sales), research, which is centred on whether and, if so, how financial risk
is influenced by environmental disclosure, remains underwhelming (Orlitzky and
Benjamin, 2001; Benlemlih et al., 2018).
The main objective of this study is to examine how environmental disclosure
affects firm risk. We focus on the idiosyncratic risk of financial investments. We
further outline the controversial predictions of economic theory and evaluate the
relevance of the specific theories for explaining the financial risk-disclosure nexus.
Another important aim of our study is to investigate if the level of idiosyncratic
risk moderates the effect of environmental disclosure. Thus far, studies focus only
on the mean of idiosyncratic risk (e.g., Mishra and Modi, 2013). If only the mean
value was adequate, forming portfolios by sorting on idiosyncratic risk should not
provide the investor with different expected returns. However, Ang et al. (2006)
prove that by sorting portfolios based on idiosyncratic risk, portfolio’s exposure to
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different factors can vary substantially. Thus, our understanding how risk is driven
outside of the mean, in the tails of a distribution, remains embryonic. Finally, we
evaluate the effect of environmental disclosure on a sample of manufacturing firms
that are subject to stringent environmental regulations (Mallin and Ow-Yong,
2012).
Our study offers four important contributions. First, although prior studies
have examined the effects of environmental disclosure on idiosyncratic risk (Lee and
Faff, 2009; Salama et al., 2011; Oikonomou et al., 2012; Cai et al., 2016; Diemont
et al., 2016; Utz, 2017; Linciano et al., 2018), we test the said relationship under the
competing theories, and we shed light on the relevance of these theories. Second, in
contrast to previous literature that uses the traditional capital asset pricing model,
and on some occasions the Carhart four factor model (Mishra and Modi, 2013;
Bouslah et al., 2013), we utilize both the four- and five-factor models to estimate
idiosyncratic risk. Third, by focusing on the idiosycnratic risk distribution, we
provide additional insights into the relationship between environmental disclosure
and idiosyncratic risk. Specifically, we show that environmental disclosure of a
portfolio has a heterogeneous financial risk effect at different idiosyncratic risk
levels, an important yet under-researched area of the empirical finance literature
(Ang et al., 2006). Fourth, this study offers new evidence from the highly regulated
EU manufacturing sector.
It is worth noting that our study is closely related to the work of Benlemlih
et al. (2018). In particular, we extend their work as we addresses their call to offer
an in-depth discussion on the connection between environmental disclosure and
idiosyncratic risk. We do so in the following ways. First, while they explore the
effect of social and environmental disclosures on different types of firm risk, our
research centres on environmental disclosure and idiosyncratic risk. Second, they
estimate idiosyncratic risk by employing a standard CAPM model, whereas we
use both the four and five-factor models. Third, their sample comprises UK firms,
whereas we analyze a sample of 17 EU countries including the UK. Fourth, unlike
Benlemlih et al. (2018), we scrutinise portfolios with different risk levels (ranked
on idiosyncratic risk). Finally, we only consider manufacturing firms because their
operations are particularly instrumental for climate change. On a final note, our
findings agree with Benlemlih et al. (2018) that indeed environmental disclosure
decreases idiosyncratic risk.
By utilizing a framework of multiple regressions in a strongly balanced data
set of 288 manufacturing firms from 17 European countries during the period from
2005 to 2016, we find significant evidence that environmental disclosure reduces id-
iosyncratic risk. This finding lends support to both the stakeholder and legitimacy
theories and emphasizes the importance of transparent environmental disclosure
as a management practice for risk-reduction. After controlling for endogeneity
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within a dynamic panel data model, results remain robust. Additionally, consis-
tent with (Ang et al., 2009), quantile regressions show an asymmetric relationship
between idiosyncratic risk and environmental disclosure. Specifically, disclosure
exerts a stronger effect on stock market investments with high rather than low
idiosyncratic risk. Thus, our results suggest that investors perceive transparent
environmental practices of EU firms as risk-reducing, in line with Ziegler et al.
(2011). However, as expected (Boehme et al., 2009), a perfectly diversified port-
folio does not seem to price in environmental disclosure, in the sense that the
systematic risk effect is insignificant. Finally, in line with Benlemlih et al. (2018),
we also show that environmental disclosure has a stronger link with idiosyncratic
risk rather than other risk types.
This research has profound implications for CEOs, portfolio managers and in-
vestors. First, the negative environmental disclosure - idiosyncratic risk nexus can
be perceived by CEOs as a signal to pledge to more transparent environmental
policies, which will be rewarded by the stock market in terms of lower idiosyn-
cratic risk of investment. Second, because idiosyncratic risk can be diversified
away, the negative effect of environmental disclosure on idiosyncratic risk helps
portfolio managers and investors to identify stocks of companies that offer greater
diversification benefits. Indeed, our results imply that investing in a portfolio with
potentially more environmentally transparent than opaque stocks can help port-
folio managers and investors to diversify the risk of portfolio investment. Third,
if the volume of financial transactions is proportional to transaction costs, then a
portfolio made up of fewer stocks may be associated with lower transaction costs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the
main hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and the methodology. In Section
4, we report the empirical results. We then conclude with Section 5.
2 Hypotheses Development
The aim of this section is to present the hypotheses of the study, which directly
stem from the theoretical framework that describes the link between environmental
disclosure and idiosyncratic risk. Starting with signalling theory (Connelly et al.,
2011), information asymmetry between stakeholders and firms can be mitigated
when firms provide transparent information about their practises. More specif-
ically, environmental disclosure can strengthen bonds with investors, customers,
suppliers and regulators (legitimacy theory) and thus firms can be less vulnerable
to both external and internal shocks. In turn, a good firm-stakeholder relationship
(stakeholder theory) serves as a safeguard that helps firms sustain their compet-
itive advantage and attain their financial objectives. However, the practice of
transparent environmental information does not necessarily translate into “good”
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environmental performance (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004) and it might be adopted
merely for symbolic purposes. To be more explicit, in line with the managerial
opportunism theory, increased disclosure could potentially increase risk in financial
markets instead of reducing it. Overall, there are three main scenarios associated
with the contribution of environmental disclosure to financial risk. First, con-
veying environmental information reduces risk because informed stakeholders can
make rational decisions by holding well-diversified portfolios. Second, conveying
environmental information increases idiosyncratic risk as firms become exposed
to the critics of climate change. Finally, the relationship may be more complex,
implying that the disclosure might abnormally influence portfolios with different
levels of idiosyncratic risk.
2.1 Positive association between Disclosure and Risk
We begin by considering the positive relationship between environmental disclo-
sure and risk. The positive association is founded on the view that providing en-
vironmental information can be costly (Cormier and Magnan, 2015). Specifically,
it is costly for the firm to design, operate and maintain a reporting mechanism.
Additionally, environmental disclosure can increase the cost of capital because it
provides information to competitors about firm’s specific environmental strate-
gies and it might be a negative sign for various shareholders (Peters and Romi,
2014). The positive association between disclosure and risk receives support from
the managerial opportunism theory (e.g., Bouslah et al., 2013). To elaborate,
this theory refers to the principal-agent problem, which suggests that agents act
according to their own preferences disregarding the principals’ objectives (Jensen
and Meckling, 1976). Particularly, managers might over-disclose merely for sym-
bolic purposes or because they aspire to be seen as being environmentally-sensitive
managers. In other words, managers might increase environmental expenditure in-
effectively. Since increased cost shrinks profits, it is implied that environmental
disclosure increases risk. Another important reason supporting the positive associ-
ation between disclosure and risk is the role of environmental regulations (Commis-
sion Regulation (EU) No 601/2012), which coerce firms to disclose. Environmental
disclosure can reduce the risk provided that firm’s environmental performance is
outstanding. If not, it becomes a cause for concern for stakeholders and translates
into heightened risk (Brown and Deegan, 1998; Lee et al., 2015). Manufacturing
firms in particular would have to bear considerably high environmental costs in
order to be able to operate “green” (Wagner, 2005). Therefore, there is in fact a
direct trade-off between cost and benefit, suggesting that manufacturing firms will
eventually face a competitive disadvantage, which informs Hypothesis 1 (H1):
Hypothesis 1 (H1): In line with managerial opportunism, high environmen-
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tal disclosure has a positive impact on idiosyncratic risk.
It should be noted that very few existing studies document a positive asso-
ciation between idiosyncratic risk and transparency (Lin et al., 2014; Wu et al.,
2016). In fact, the majority of the studies argue in favour of a negative association
(Ferreira and Laux, 2007; Mishra and Modi, 2013; Cai et al., 2016; Utz, 2017).
2.2 Negative association between Disclosure and Risk
Turning to the negative-association theoretical framework, environmental disclo-
sure reduces asymmetric information and signals that firms place particular em-
phasis on their environmental practices. That is, on one hand, environmental
disclosure minimises the risk of damaging the reputation of the firm, while on the
other hand, governments are able to exercise less regulatory environmental pres-
sure (Reinhardt and Stavins, 2010). This negative association between disclosure
and risk is predicted by the stakeholder theory. This theory advocates that a green
firm is more efficient, enjoys increased visibility, reduces its operational costs, as
well as, develops strong bonds with ethical-investors, employees, consumers Salama
et al. (2011) and Oikonomou et al. (2012) identify that social actions significantly
decrease systematic risk and raise concerns about the potential impact on idiosyn-
cratic risk.
In addition, the principal assumption of the negative-association framework is
that firms operate within a society where they have to contribute and inform the
public about their environmental actions. In turn, the ethical side of the relation-
ship is best described by the legitimacy theory. According to this theory, reporting
environmental information would help to legitimise corporate actions and abate
the demands from society (Guthrie and Parker, 1989). For instance, disclosing a
firm’s environmental performance could result in alleviating external pressure for
climate change. Furthermore, transparent information regarding environmental
performance implies that firms have to become eco-friendly in order to make their
environmental sensitivity known and hence boost their profitability (Ben-Amar
and McIlkenny, 2015). For this reason, according to the legitimacy theory, any
firm which informs both its investors and the society should be rewarded because
(i) it legitimises its actions and (ii) it diminishes asymmetric information.
There are numerous studies that examine the impact of environmental disclo-
sure on stock performance (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Dawkins and Fraas, 2011;
Matsumura et al., 2014; Nollet et al., 2016). All these studies opine that higher
levels of disclosure improve firms’ financial performance. On a parallel note, there
are also studies that examine whether both corporate social strengths and concerns
are linked with idiosyncratic risk (Salama et al., 2011; Bouslah et al., 2013; Mishra
and Modi, 2013; Cai et al., 2016; Diemont et al., 2016). These studies underscore
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that social activities might positively affect the investment climate. For instance,
Lins et al. (2017) show that social investments can reduce idiosyncratic risk. Dur-
ing turbulent periods, when trust wanes, symmetric environmental information
acts as insurance policy for investors and thus investors may place a valuation
premium on these firms. Perhaps the only existing article which is related to the
present study in this respect is Benlemlih et al. (2018). These authors, examine
the effect of corporate and environmental disclosures on idiosyncratic, systematic
and total risk utilizing a sample of British companies. Their findings further sup-
port that disclosure significantly decreases idiosyncratic risk, but not systematic
risk. Overall, the majority of the empirical literature accords with the negative
association between corporate actions and risk. In this regard, we formulate our
Hypothesis 2 (H2):
Hypothesis 2 (H2): In line with both the legitimacy and the stakeholder
theories, high environmental disclosure has a negative impact on idiosyncratic
risk.
2.3 Ranking on Idiosyncratic risk
Existing relevant literature highlights the fact that the level of environmental en-
gagement can affect the financial performance of the firm by solely focusing on
the mean of the financial performance distribution (e.g, Misani and Pogutz, 2015;
Qiu et al., 2016; Trumpp and Guenther, 2017; Lewandowski, 2017). Conversely,
Tzouvanas et al. (2019) demonstrate that investigating the tails of the financial
performance distribution could offer different results. Along a similar vein, we
argue that disclosure might affect differently investment-portfolios with high and
low risk. If capital asset pricing models correctly price risk, then portfolios with
different idiosyncratic risk should provide homogeneous expectations regarding re-
turns and/or other risk exposure factors. Nonetheless, Ang et al. (2006) and Ang
et al. (2009) provide a multitude of empirical examples to show that portfolios with
different idiosyncratic risk are heterogeneously affected by different risk exposure
factors. Notwithstanding, this result cannot be explained by traditional financial
theory. In fact, sorting portfolios on idiosyncratic risk could provide additional
insights on the risk exposure factors that cannot be captured by traditional asset
pricing models, such as, the dispersion of opinions in the financial markets (Miller,
1977), liquidity risk (Boehme et al., 2009) or the effect from other economic vari-
ables (Ang et al., 2009). In this regard, we expect that transparent information
about climate change should have a heterogeneous effect on the idiosyncratic risk
distribution. This expectation informs our Hypothesis 3 (H3):
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Environmental disclosure can heterogeneously affect
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idiosyncratic risk at different levels of idiosyncratic risk.
3 Research Design
3.1 Sample and Data
The sample consists of 288 European firms of the manufacturing sector that are
included in the STOXX Europe 600 Index across 17 countries of the European
region, covering a 12 year period from 2005 to 2016 (see Table 1). Those firms
are chosen because the unavailability of data creates constrains for investigating
larger sample. In addition, manufacturing firms have been highly criticized because
they emit large amounts of carbon, which by turn triggers climate change. For
this reason, the EU environmental regulations2 have enforced firms to disclose
essential information about their climate change actions and at the same time
firms are monitored for the reliability of the data. 2005 has been chosen as the
initial year as it was the year when the EU emissions trading scheme was launched
and Kyoto Protocol was set into force.
INSERT TABLE [1]
3.2 Variables of the Study
3.2.1 Idiosyncratic risk
To answer the hypotheses, idiosyncratic risk needs to be constructed. Previous
studies (e.g., Ferreira and Laux, 2007; Fu, 2009) define idiosyncratic risk as the
standard deviation of the residuals of the pricing models. The capital asset pric-
ing model, three-factor (Fama and French, 1993) and four-factor (Carhart, 1997)
models have been used for this type of examination extensively. We compute our
measure of idiosyncratic risk based on the four-factor model following Ang et al.
(2006), Mishra and Modi (2013), Bouslah et al. (2013) and Cai et al. (2016).
Ri,d−Rf,d = αi+βi,1(Rm,d−Rf,d)+βi,2SMBd+βi,3HMLd+βi,4MOMd+ui,d (1)
2Commission Regulation (EU) No 601/2012 of 21 June 2012 on the monitoring and report-
ing of greenhouse gas emissions pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council. During the second compliance cycle of the greenhouse gas emissions trad-
ing scheme, covering the years 2008 to 2012, industrial operators, aviation operators, verifiers
and competent authorities have gained experience with monitoring and reporting pursuant to
Commission Decision 2007/589/EC of 18 July 2007 establishing guidelines for the monitoring
and reporting of greenhouse gas emissions pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council. The rules for the third trading period of the Union’s greenhouse
gas emission allowance trading scheme which begins on 1 January 2013 and for the following
trading periods should build on that experience.
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The left part of the equation corresponds to the excess stock return, alpha (αi)
shows the performance of a stock relative to the market portfolio, (Rm,d − Rf,d)
is the excess return on the market portfolio, the second factor (SMBd) measures
the return of small over large stocks, (HMLd) the return of value over growth
stocks, the momentum factor measures the portfolio returns of winner over loser
stocks (MOMd) and ui,d is the residuals. Rm,d, Rf,d, SMBd, HMLd and MOMd
values for the European market are retrieved from Kenneth R. French website.
Data on stock prices is obtained from Datastream. Moreover, log-returns, Ri,d,
are computed by means of Ri,d = logPi,d − logPi,d−1, where Pi,d is the price of
stock i in time d. All the aforementioned values are on a daily frequency (d) for
all 288 firms for the 12 year period. We next run ordinary least squares (OLS)
regressions to Equation (1) by assuming that the residuals are normally distributed
with zero mean and constant variance. We repeat this procedure for each year of
the sample in order to obtain 12 different variances for every firm. Then, we define
the idiosyncratic risk (Risk) as the annualized standard deviation of the residuals
(Risk = σ(ui,d) ×
√
K × 100%) (Boehme et al., 2009), where k corresponds to
trading days of any year given with k ≈ 251).
3.2.2 Environmental disclosure
Answering the hypotheses, environmental disclosure score (Disc) is used. Disclo-
sure is produced by Bloomberg database and it measures the quality and mag-
nitude of the environmental information disclosed by each firm. While previous
studies use binary or low range scores to account for the disclosure (see, Fisher-
Vanden and Thorburn, 2011; Barnett and Salomon, 2012; Hsu and Wang, 2013;
Matsumura et al., 2014), our score takes values from 0 to 100 with the lowest val-
ues corresponding to lack of climate change information. This indicates that our
examination might vary substantially across different quantiles. The fact that con-
temporaneous literature has a growing interest in Bloomberg’s scores strengthens
the appropriateness of this variable as a proxy of environmental disclosure (Nollet
et al., 2016; Broadstock et al., 2018; Petitjean, 2019). As examined by Qiu et al.
(2016) and Benlemlih et al. (2018), the score weights the information provided by
firms for 60 different environmental actions and it is normalized according to the
mean disclosure of the industry where firms operate (see more about environmental
disclosure in Appendix).
3.2.3 Other Control Variables
We employ a set of different variables that affect the idiosyncratic risk (Table 2).
First, the probability of default measured by Altman’s Z-score (Z), low values
correspond to higher probability of default and should induce higher idiosyncratic
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risk (Bouslah et al., 2013). Z-score sums up five weighted measures in order to
classify firms according to their financial distress and it uses both accounting and
market based indicators. Firms with high probability of default are closely tied to
idiosyncratic risk (Lopez, 2004). In contrast to default risk, leverage (Lev) is debt
to equity ratio which is measured by summing the short and long term liabilities
divided by the market value. Leverage is a proxy of financial risk and it is expected
to be positive because risky firms hold usually more debt (Ang et al., 2006; Psillaki
et al., 2010; Mallin and Ow-Yong, 2012). High leverage implies that stakeholders
bear a high amount of cash flow risk and therefore volatility of the stock return
increases.
Furthermore, larger firms have diversified activities and hence less idiosyncratic
risk. We use as a size proxy the logarithm of the total assets (LogTa) (Lee and
Faff, 2009; Mishra and Modi, 2013; Cai et al., 2016). Profitability is linked to risk.
Return on assets (ROA) measures the ability of the firm to generate profits from its
assets and it is used as a proxy for financial profitability. High profitability might
act as signal to investors about the soundness of the firm (Mishra and Modi, 2013).
Another profitability proxy is the the annual growth rate of total sales (Growth);
Growth displays the firm’s cash flows and so it is expected to decrease risk (Ang
et al., 2006).
Additionally, the future prosperity can be represented by intangible assets
(Inta). They cannot be easily collateralized but they add value to the firm (Psillaki
et al., 2010). Intangible assets have characteristics of Research and Development
(R&D) and it might either generate future profits or losses (Elsayed and Paton,
2005). Intangibility is generally expected to have negative association with risk.
Also, tangible assets (Tang) can be a proxy for the collateral of the firm. Negative
relation between risk and tangibility is expected because creditors can liquidate
assets easily and thus they face less risk (Konar and Cohen, 2001).
An important aspect of the investigation is to control for the slack resources
of the firms. Slack resources may be a consequence of good financial performance,
leading to excess resources, which yield additional funds that can be invested in
environmentally and socially responsible activities, or it can also be the result of
bad planning (Nohria and Gulati, 1996). Slack resources can either be unabsorbed
or absorbed. Unabsorbed slack ameliorates the financial performance of firms, while
absorbed slack refers to bad planning. The former would indicate that slack de-
creases idiosyncratic risk because resources can be re-deployed for other organi-
zational purposes, while the latter increases idiosyncratic risk because resources
cannot be re-deployed for other activities (Symeou et al., 2019). In either case,
slack resources should affect idiosyncratic risk (Ang et al., 2006). Slack resources
can be measured as a liquidity ratio (Liq) (Bansal, 2005; Aguilera-Caracuel et al.,
2015); that is, the ratio between current assets and current liabilities.
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Finally, we include year (Year), industry (Industry) and country (Country)
dummies to control for the unobserved firm heterogeneity. Different industries
have been observed to have different risk and different countries affect dis-similarly
the idiosyncratic risk of their firms (Chen and Wang, 2012; Mishra and Modi, 2013;
Wu et al., 2016).
INSERT TABLE [2]
3.3 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
We now turn to present some descriptive statistics and correlations of the variables
employed in the regressions. Firstly, our final sample numerates 3,465 firm-year
observations. Having a closer look at panel A in Table 3, disclosure is the variable
with the most missing values comparing to the rest of the data-set with 2788 valid
observations. In a pooled sample of 901,728 firm-daily observations, we extract
3389 annual idiosyncratic risk values, which have a mean (median) of 26.96 (24.11)
with the highest value being 115.08 and standard deviation of 10.62. In terms of
the distribution of the variables Disc, Inta, ROA and LogTA are very close to
satisfy the normality conditions (Skewness=0 and Kurtosis=3). While Risk, Z,
Lev, Tang, Growth and Liq have a leptokurtic distribution and they also have fat
upper tails apart from Lev with a thick lower tail. Panel B reports the correlations.
Pairwise correlations provide some preliminary view of the effect of independent
variables on Risk. Note that most of the examined variables have a negative and
very low correlation with Risk. Particularly, disclosure negatively correlates with
Risk at a rate of 22.3%.
INSERT TABLE [3]
If high environmental disclosure decreases (increases) idiosyncratic risk, then the
theory of finance will imply that lower (higher) risk should be followed by lower
(higher) returns (Merton, 1987). Hence, our investigation would be only mean-
ingful for investors who want to shift their risk-taking levels. However, Table 4
shows that this is not the case. In line with the empirical literature, high idiosyn-
cratic risk portfolios exhibit lower returns and low idiosyncratic risk portfolios
have higher returns (Miller, 1977; Ang et al., 2006). Sharpe ratio and alpha (α)
also exhibit that investments in low idiosyncratic risk portfolios have better per-
formance than investments in high idiosyncratic risk portfolios. We now proceed
to econometrically test whether indeed disclosing environmental information can




This subsection presents three different types of econometric techniques. (1) Panel,
(2) dynamic panel and (3) quantile regressions. We are trying to capture all
different aspects of risk-disclosure relationship since there is no extensive literature
on this particular topic. The methodology aims to deal with the endogenous and
non-linear estimates and at the same time to provide insights into the overall effect
of environmental disclosure on the financial risk.
3.4.1 Panel Data Model
Having discussed about how environmental disclosure and risk are connected, we
now proceed to estimate their relationship. Following previous studies (e.g., Del-
mas et al., 2015; Nollet et al., 2016) we employ panel data methodology and we














Where the subscripts i and t correspond to firm and year respectively, i = 1, 2, ..., n
and t = 1, 2, ..., T and ei,t the error term. Risk denotes the idiosyncratic volatility
and X′ is a vector that contains control variables (Z, Lev, Inta, Tang, ROA,
LogTa, Growth and Liq). We also control for year, industry and country fixed ef-
fects, so a0 intercept is refereed to the base year (2005), industry (Technology) and
country (Germany) where m = 1, 2, ...,M and j = 1, 2, ..., J . Particular attention
should be placed on the variable of interest which is Disc and the coefficient we
should observe is a1. According to the first hypothesis (H1), we perform one-tailed
test, so the null hypothesis is H10 : a1 ≤ 0 and alternative H21 : a1 > 0. Similarly
to answer hypothesis 2 (H2), H20 : a1 ≥ 0 and alternative H21 : a1 < 0.
The results are presented under the pooled OLS, fixed effects and random
effects models. For all different specifications, we use robust standard errors. Fixed
effects model is appropriate when we focus on a specific firm characteristics (ci) and
therefore ei,t= vi,t + ci with vi,t being a time-varying error component. Note that
in case of fixed effects model industry and country dummies are dropped from
the model to avoid multicollinearity. Random effect model represents random
draws from the population so that ci allows for individual effects. In contrast
with the previous models, pooled OLS estimates constant coefficients (ci = c).
Finally, we report likelihood ratio redundant fixed effects and Hausman test in
order to identify if the individual effects ci are unobserved and are correlated with
explanatory variables (Baltagi, 2008; Oikonomou et al., 2012).
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3.4.2 Dynamic Panel Data Model
The problem of endogeneity which has been reported continuously should be care-
fully considered (Tamazian and Bhaskara Rao, 2010; Coban and Topcu, 2013;
Albertini, 2013; Endrikat et al., 2014; Busch and Lewandowski, 2018). Endogene-
ity arises due to simultaneity or omitted variable bias. Riskier firms normally
undertake more environmental projects and thus risk and disclosure are endoge-
nous (Orlitzky and Benjamin, 2001). This is because it involves a commitment to
financially support environmental actions. Therefore, risk might influence the en-
vironmental disclosure of firms. Endogeneity in panel data is commonly controlled
with generalized method of moments model (GMM) or with two-stage least squares
(2SLS). The main advantage of GMM is that it can treat all control variables as
endogenous as well as there is no need to identify exogenous instruments. Identify-
ing exogenous variables to instrument the endogenous variable may be challenging
task and eventually may never be exogenous precisely (Broadstock et al., 2018).
For this reason, GMM relies on internal instruments (lagged values or internal
transformation). For example, it may not be the current environmental disclosure
that affects idiosyncratic risk, but rather the previous year’s disclosure could be
playing a significant role.
A system of generalized method of moments (Sys-GMM), which is proposed by
Blundell and Bond (1998) can control for endogeneity in our estimations. Hence,
equation 2 is now tested with dynamic panel model:














Equation 3 is instrumented with lagged values of the explanatory variables. How-
ever, lagged values are usually weak instruments and thus Sys-GMM combines the
first-difference estimator with the estimator in levels in order to efficiently deal with
endogeneity. The description of the variables is as above and again ei,t = vi,t + ci
is referred to the typical fixed effects components of the error term, with the as-
sumption that E(vi,t) = E(ci) = E(vi,tci) = 0, for i = 1, .., n and t = 2, .., T . The
model is appropriate to re-address the hypotheses 1 and 2 (H1 and H2).
In order to satisfy the orthogonality condition, we collapse instruments as pro-
posed by Roodman (2009) because large number of instruments would lead to finite
sample bias and therefore we assume that E(Riski,t−1∆vi,t) = E(∆Riski,tvi,t−1)=
0. We collapse instruments after two lags. Also, Hansen’s (1982) J-test measures
the validity of instruments. We also use two-step Sys-GMM which is based on
corrected standard errors (Windmeijer, 2005).
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3.4.3 Non-parametric Model
In order to ascertain how disclosure influences idiosyncratic risk of firms with
different risk levels we employ quantile regression model, which was introduced
by Koenker and Bassett (1978). We investigate parameters that describe the 5%,
25%, median, 75% and 95% of the conditional distribution. The main advantage
of this method is that it captures the abrupt changes of Disc on Risk. It can be
linearly represented as:
Riski,t = π(τ) + γ(τ)Disci,t + Y
′
i,tθ(τ) + εi,t, τ ∈ (0, 1) (4)
Where Risk is the dependent variable, π is the intercept, Y is a vector that
contains all explanatory variables, θ(τ) is the parameters, ε signifies the error term
and τ refers to the part the of Risk distribution. We assume that the error is equal
to zero at the conditional τ th quantile [Qε(τ |Y, Disc) = 0]. Also, the parameter
γ for any given quantile τ for a sample of N observations can be calculated with
linear programming as follows:








ρτ [Riski,t − π(τ)− γ(τ)Disci,t −Y′i,tθ(τ)]
where check function ρτ (.) is defined as:
ρτ (ε) =
{
τεi,t, if εi,t ≥ 0;
(τ − 1)εi,t, if εi,t < 0
We use bootstrap estimates of γ(τ) in order to calculate the covariance ma-
trix. We compute standard errors with 1000 bootstrap replications and thus we
obtain asymptotically normally distributed estimators which are valid under het-
eroskedasticity.
In order to investigate the Hypothesis 3 (H3: Disc heterogeneously affects
Risk), we consider that γ coefficients do not vary across the conditional distri-
bution. Therefore jointly equality test is performed. The null hypothesis is that
the slope of disclosure is the same across quantiles and can be written as H30 :
γ0.05 = γ0.25 = γ0.50 = γ0.75 = γ0.95, otherwise disclosure unequally influences risk.
4 Results
4.1 Panel Data Models
Results relating to Hypotheses 1 and 2 are reported in Table 5. Columns 1, 2 and 3
report the pooled-OLS, fixed effects and random effects models respectively. Con-
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cerning the control variables, Inta, Tang, ROA and LogTa reduce idiosyncratic
risk; finding which is in line with our expectations and previous literature (Konar
and Cohen, 2001; Mishra and Modi, 2013; Cai et al., 2016), while higher Lev and
Liq unexpectedly increase idiosyncratic risk (Ang et al., 2006; Psillaki et al., 2010).
Z and Growth do not appear to have a significant effect on the idiosyncratic risk.
The results from the three models support Hypothesis 2 and clearly reject Hy-
pothesis 1. Hence, transparent information about climate change significantly
decreases the idiosyncratic risk of EU manufacturing firms. This finding is in line
with both the legitimacy and stakeholder theory. Overall, it provides additional
support to existing literature, which acknowledges the benefits from social cor-
porate actions (Lee and Faff, 2009; Salama et al., 2011; Oikonomou et al., 2012;
Mishra and Modi, 2013; Cai et al., 2016).
INSERT TABLE [5]
It is worth noting that Disc significantly adds to the explanatory power of our
benchmark model. This highlights the importance of environmental disclosure as
determinant of idiosyncratic risk. We should underline that the goodness of fit
of the models reaches 60%, which indicates that the chosen variables can explain
a high proportion of the idiosyncratic risk of stock returns. Also, the likelihood
ratio specifies that the pooled-OLS model is not appropriate in this examination
due to the fact that firms have different characteristics. We cannot reject though
that pooled-OLS provides with unbiased results since we have controlled for a
set of different attributes. On a final note, the Hausman test indicates that the
random effects model is preferable relative to the fixed effects in this instance.
This indicates that our sample is representative for all manufacturing firms in the
EU.
Regarding the dynamic panel results, column 4 of Table 5 reports the two-step
Sys-GMM of Equation 3. Dynamic panel regressions are appropriate to address the
problem of endogenous variables and consequently to re-address Hypotheses 1 and
2. In this regard, we cannot reject Hypothesis 2 that the Disc−Risk relationship
is negative; consistent with the previous estimates. Even if Risk and Disc are
bidirectionally related (Orlitzky and Benjamin, 2001), results demonstrate that
environmental disclosure is tied up with a risk-reduction hypothesis.
It is important to underline the validity of the model. Hansen J-test reports
p-values of 48%, signifying the validity of the instruments. AR(1) and AR(2) re-
lated to the first differenced equation denote that there is first order autocorrelated
disturbances and no second order autocorrelation. Windmeijer (2005) affirms that
the two-step estimator with the finite sample correction for standard errors pro-
vides unbiased results. As expected the autoregressive term for Risk is positive
and highly statistically significant, underlining the memory of the idiosyncratic
risk (Ang et al., 2006).
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Interestingly, the panel estimates report larger coefficients in comparison with
the Sys-GMM. An explanation is that the autoregressive term in the Sys-GMM
model absorb a large proportion of the systematic influence of the control vari-
ables. Also, we cannot reject that panel estimates are affected by endogeneity.
Nevertheless, Disc remains negative and statistically significant at 1% level. This
finding is in line with the majority of empirical studies (Ziegler et al., 2011; Salama
et al., 2011; Oikonomou et al., 2012; Mishra and Modi, 2013; Cai et al., 2016; Utz,
2017) and therefore we provide evidence supporting the negative theoretical frame-
work for European firms. At the same time, results do reveal that environmental
disclosure could be a rational managerial decision to reduce firm’s specific risk and
it is also evident that environmental disclosure can be priced in financial markets.
4.2 Non-parametric Model
The use of quantile regressions help us to analyze the dependence between Disc
and Risk. Panel and dynamic panel regressions estimate the average effect of
Disc on Risk. In turn, quantile regressions are able to estimate the tails of the
idiosyncratic risk distribution (see, e.g., Ang et al., 2006). Table 6 considers 5
different quantiles based on Equation 4.
INSERT TABLE [6]
The results of quantile regressions are interpreted in a very similar way to OLS
regressions, except that quantile regressions can predict not only the mean of the
dependent variable but also different quantiles. This gives us the capability of
sorting portfolios on idiosyncratic risk and detect the effects of different variables
on these sorted portfolios. Similar to the parametric models; Int, Tang, ROA and
LogTa appear to significantly decrease idiosyncratic risk for the largest part of
the conditional distribution. In particular, tangible assets significantly contribute
to the Risk in the upper part of the distribution, whereas intangible assets are
insignificant at the upper tail only. Also, Z, Lev and Growth are insignificant for
the whole distribution, while Liq appears positive across the distribution. Another
important aspect of the model is that it explains from 31 to 41% of the variability
of Risk (see, Pseudo R2).
INSERT FIGURE [1]
Turning to Hypothesis 3, quantile regressions reveal that Disc and Risk
exhibit a negative and heterogeneous association, which lends support to our Hy-
pothesis 3. Table 6 shows that higher environmental disclosure significantly re-
duces Risk. This is apparent at the upper part of the distribution, while the
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lower tail is insignificant with a coefficient close to null. The lower tail represents
firms with low idiosyncratic risk and therefore perfectly diversified activities; such
investments are unaffected by the environmental disclosure. To visualize this, Fig-
ure 1 displays a downward trend of environmental disclosure coefficients (Y-axis)
as idiosyncratic risk increases (X-axis). The practical implications of this finding
are particularly interesting. Environmental disclosure is valued by the investors
and thus higher degree of diversification can be attained with a portfolio of dis-
closing firms. However, investors should not value environmental disclosure in a
well-diversified portfolio. Confirming the above, equality test shows that envi-
ronmental disclosure coefficients have statistical differences across the conditional
distribution. Therefore, we cannot reject that environmental disclosure heteroge-
neously affects idiosyncratic risk (H3).
Overall, by testing the three hypotheses the following conclusions can be drawn:
(1) environmental disclosure has a significant and negative impact on idiosyncratic
risk; (2) the effect of environmental disclosure on idiosyncratic risk varies signif-
icantly across the conditional distribution of idiosyncratic risk; (3) this finding
confirms Hypotheses 2 and 3 and hence the negative theoretical framework allow-
ing for heterogeneous effects is more appropriate to model the relationship.
4.3 Robustness checks
In order to check the sensitivity and accuracy of the results, we substitute some
variables from the benchmark model (see Equation 2) and we repeat the same
regression procedure. In particular, we use two alternative dependent variables.
First, firm’s total risk also matters as indicated by Bouslah et al. (2013) and Ben-
lemlih et al. (2018). Total risk (T.Risk) includes both the systematic and idiosyn-
cratic risk components and can be measured as the annualized standard deviation
of the daily stock returns. Second, we also consider an alternative approach to
measure idiosyncratic risk. Fama and French (2015) propose a five factor capital
asset pricing model. In Equation (1), the authors remove the MOMd component
and add two new terms as shown bellow:
Ri,d −Rf,d = αi + βi,1(Rm,d −Rf,d) + βi,2SMBd + βi,3HMLd + βi,4RMWd
+ βi,5CMAd + ui,d,
(5)
where RMWd is the difference of stock returns between robust and weak profitabil-
ity firms and CMAd is the return of low over high investment firms. By running
OLS regressions to Equation (5), the five-factor idiosyncratic risk (5.Risk) is the
annualized standard deviation of the residuals.
Additionally, previous literature commonly uses accounting profitability ratios
to examine the disclosure-performance relationship; instead of ROA, we add To-
bin’s Q (Q) as a measurement of market-based profitability indicator (measured as
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the market value of a firm to the replacement costs of its assets) (Konar and Co-
hen, 2001; Broadstock et al., 2018). Lastly, intangible assets attempted to capture
a part of R&D expenses, which have been argued to be of a major importance of
the examination (Konar and Cohen, 2001; Elsayed and Paton, 2005; Duqi et al.,
2015). R&D was not included in our primary analysis due to the high number of
missing values (similarly to Delmas et al., 2015).
INSERT TABLE [7]
Table 7 presents the robustness checks, columns 1, 2 and 3 report the random
effect, Sys-GMM and median regression results respectively and the denotation a
and b indicates that the dependent variable is either the idiosyncratic risk from the
5-factor model or the total risk. In terms of the idiosyncratic risk of the 5-factor
model, our results are qualitatively similar to the previous estimations. Interest-
ingly, results cannot support a relationship between environmental disclosure and
total risk. Since we have established that disclosure has an impact on idiosyncratic
risk, it can be implied that disclosure and the systematic risk component are irrel-
evant (Benlemlih et al., 2018). We extend our analysis by excluding British firms.
This is mainly done because the sample is over-represented by British firms and
it is rational to consider a post-Brexit scenario. Previous literature shows that
British firms are environmentally sensitive (Salama et al., 2011) and thus this is
how the negative sign (Disc−Risk) dominates. However, results reported in Table
8 remain robust for the rest of the European firms.
INSERT TABLE [8]
5 Conclusion
This paper examines the environmental disclosure - idiosyncratic risk relationship
for a panel of 288 EU manufacturing firms. In the main analysis, we use four
factor model (Carhart, 1997) to extract the idiosyncratic risk of the firms, while
the environmental disclosure score has been retrieved from Bloomberg database.
Relevant empirical literature along with the economic theory suggest that envi-
ronmental actions and financial performance exhibit an endogenous and non-linear
relationship (Tzouvanas et al., 2019). For this reason, panel, dynamic panel and
quantile regressions with the inclusion of different set of control variables attempt
to shed light on the examination.
Our empirical investigation confirms the generic hypothesis that it is less risky
to be informative. Particularly, the findings demonstrate that environmental dis-
closure heterogeneously reduces idiosyncratic risk. This result is robust under
different specifications and it is consistent with a large part of literature that ac-
knowledges the importance of high environmental visibility (Dawkins and Fraas,
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2011; Matsumura et al., 2014; Ben-Amar and McIlkenny, 2015). For this reason,
regulators should further advance environmental sensitivity and firms should be
encouraged to increase their environmental transparency because eventually this
engagement can be described as a “win-win” situation; monitoring climate change
risk (Stern, 2007) and decreasing idiosyncratic risk.
Furthermore, our results underline the prominent role of transparent infor-
mation on the financial markets. The comprehensive and articulated picture of
environmental disclosure on idiosyncratic risk suggests that the negative theoret-
ical framework is more suitable to frame the relationship. Therefore, it can be
extracted that management should consider to provide transparent environmental
information as a means of risk reduction. At the same time, environmental disclo-
sure seems to reveal a unique dimension of idiosyncratic risk which can potentially
enhance our understanding about the information content of idiosyncratic risk
(e.g., Fu, 2009; Wu et al., 2016).
The main limitation of the study is that the score of environmental disclosure is
assumed to be objective (Nollet et al., 2016; Benlemlih et al., 2018). Future studies
should investigate the quality of environmental actions that are disclosed by firms.
An alternative interesting avenue for future research would be to construct an
environmental disclosure index and conduct a similar examination controlling for
a larger number of countries and industries. Moreover, a greater number of risk
measurements (as dependent variables) might be dis-similarly correlated with a
larger number of environmental performance variables (as independent variables)
(see for example meta-analyses, Horvathova, 2010; Albertini, 2013; Endrikat et al.,
2014).
In turn, future studies could concentrate on investigating the relationship be-
tween environmental disclosure and systematic risk. On a final note, our study
motivates further research related to the diversification benefits of portfolios with
symmetric environmental information (see, Merton, 1987; Ang et al., 2006; Fu,
2009).
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Table 1: Industry and Country Composition




Consumer Discretionary 56 19.44
Consumer Staples 40 13.89
Industrials 88 30.56
Basic Material 40 13.89
Energy 17 5.9
Utilities 24 8.33
Panel B: Country Composition
Country Frequency Percent
Germany 36 12.5

















Firms are allocated to industries according to the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB).
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Table 2: Variable description and source of data
Variables Concept Source
Risk
(Idiosyncratic risk) Annualized standard




(Idiosyncratic risk) Annualized standard




(Total risk) Annualized standard deviation
of stock returns
Datastream
Disc Environmental disclosure score Bloomberg
Z
(Default risk) Altman’s Z = 1.2*(WC/
TA)+1.4* (RE/ TA)+3.3* (EBIT/ TA)
+(Sales/ TA)+0.6* (MV/ TL), higher score
denotes lower probability of default
Datastream,
Bloomberg
Lev Leverage = total debt/total equity Datastream
Inta Intangible assets/TA Bloomberg
Tang Tangible assets/ TA Bloomberg
ROA Return on assets Bloomberg
LogTa Log of TA Datastream
Growth Annual growth rate of total sales Bloomberg
Liq Liquidity ratio = current assets / current liabilities Datastream
Q Tobin’s Q = (MV + TL + PE + MI) / TA Bloomberg





Variables for calculations , WC= working
capital, TA= total assets, EBIT= earnings
before interest and taxes, RE= retained
earnings, MV= market value, TL= total




a The factors (SML, HML, MOM, RMW, CMA, RM and Rf ) to calculate idiosyncratic risk
are retrieved from Kenneth R. French Data library (http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/
faculty/ken.french/data_library.html.
b All money-based indicators for all countries, for each given year, are adjusted into current Euro.
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics and correlations of the main variables
Panel A: Descriptive statistics
(1) Risk (2) Disc (3) Z (4) Lev (5) Inta (6) Tang (7) ROA (8) LogTA (9) Growth (10) Liq
Obs 3389 2788 3232 3437 3282 3349 3341 3437 3390 3393
Mean 26.96 35.68 4.86 90.25 0.22 0.80 6.06 9.06 9.03 1.49
Std 10.62 16.21 9.97 601.48 0.19 0.22 5.34 1.46 66.81 1.57
Min 10.62 2.33 -0.52 -22583.33 0.00 0.00 -9.03 3.41 -91.06 0.00
1st Q 19.75 23.96 2.32 34.98 0.06 0.68 2.83 8.04 -1.25 0.96
Med 24.11 37.21 3.46 64.57 0.18 0.85 5.21 9 5.09 1.25
3rd Q 31.30 47.29 4.99 114.72 0.35 0.96 8.43 10.15 12.56 1.67
Max 115.08 75.97 328.07 10020.93 1.16 2.72 28.28 12.9 2290.13 46.15
Skew 1.90 -0.09 19.83 -20.69 0.92 -0.08 0.94 0.04 27.66 15.40
Kurt 9.14 2.31 524.37 872.52 3.29 8.84 4.93 2.62 868.33 353.29
Panel B: Correlations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(1) 1
(2) -0.2229* 1
(3) 0.0563* -0.1365* 1
(4) -0.0153 0.0291 -0.0244 1
(5) -0.0914* -0.0895* -0.0841* 0.0203 1
(6) -0.0005 -0.0192 0.1034* -0.0091 0.0051 1
(7) -0.1165* -0.1282* 0.1882* -0.0411* -0.03 -0.0242 1
(8) -0.2501* 0.4932* -0.2642* 0.0543* -0.0054 -0.0909* -0.3482* 1
(9) 0.0599* -0.0485* 0.034 0.0149 0.0282 -0.0045 0.0721* -0.0487* 1
(10) 0.1389* -0.0920* 0.5864* -0.0248 -0.1644* 0.0326* 0.1071* -0.2627* 0.0200 1
All variables are defined in Table 2. * denotes 10% level of significance. Std= standard deviation, Q= quartile, Med=median, Skew=
skewness and Kurt= kurtosis.
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Table 4: Variables sorted by idiosyncratic risk
1 Low 2 3 4 5 6 High 1-6
Disc 43.527 39.925 36.612 34.665 32.038 26.849 16.678
T.Risk 0.172 0.212 0.256 0.316 0.440 0.663 -0.491
r 0.084 0.092 0.096 0.096 -0.092 -0.281 0.365
α 0.027 0.025 0.020 0.016 -0.036 -0.046 0.073
β1 0.420 0.499 0.563 0.637 0.621 0.643 -0.223
Sharpe 0.517 0.448 0.391 0.329 -0.150 -0.354 0.872
Quantile portfolios “1” to “6” from Low to High idiosyncratic risk. Portfolios are sorted according
to the idiosyncratic risk distribution (q), with “1”, “2”, “3”, “4”, “5” and “6” correspond to
q ≤ 5%, 5% < q ≤ 25%, 25% < q ≤ 50%, 50% < q ≤ 75%, 75% < q ≤ 95%, and q > 95%,
respectively. Portfolio “1-6” represents a strategy that goes long the lowest idiosyncratic quantile
and short the highest idiosyncratic quantile. Alpha (α) measures the performance of a stock
compared with the market portfolio. The variable r denotes the annual excess return (Ri,t−Rf,t)
of the portfolio and β1 is the systematic risk (the coefficient of Rm,d − Rf,d) from the Carhart
four-factor model. Sharpe ratio (
Ri,t−Rf,t
σi,t
) measures the annual financial performance (returns)
of portfolios adjusted for risk.
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Table 5: Regression results for Idiosyncratic risk
Pooled OLS Fixed effects Random effects Sys-GMM
(1a) (1b) (2) (3) (4)
Riskt−1 0.528***
(0.0844)
Disc -0.0508*** -0.0601*** -0.0558*** -0.0220**
(0.0111) (0.0220) (0.0179) (0.0108)
Z 0.0530 0.0545 -0.0647 -0.0425 0.0497
(0.0591) (0.05864) (0.0729) (0.0588) (0.0214)
Lev 0.000302* 0.000316* 0.000316** 0.000315** 0.000107
(0.0001542) (0.000169) (0.000143) (0.000148) (0.000288)
Inta -4.0194*** -4.146*** -7.424*** -6.400*** -1.911**
(0.717) (0.7136) (2.515) (1.456) (0.761)
Tang -0.1048** -0.1045*** -0.149 -0.121** -0.0671***
(0.048) (0.046) (0.419) (0.0479) (0.0219)
ROA -0.411*** -0.388*** -0.381*** -0.374*** -0.235***
(0.0478) (0.048) (0.0664) (0.0624) (0.0488)
LogTa -1.558*** -1.248*** -2.659*** -1.581*** -0.504**
(0.1241) (0.143) (0.736) (0.261) (0.194)
Growth 0.005** 0.0045* 0.0035 0.0034 0.0029
(0.00223) (0.00236) (0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0022)
Liq 1.673*** 1.675*** -0.466 0.505* 0.779***
(0.2899) (0.2870) (0.454) (0.266) (0.208)
Cons 37.29*** 35.09*** 49.98*** 39.90*** 18.85***
(1.88) (1.97) (6.76) (3.19) (3.604)
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Country Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Likelihood ratio 7.44 [0]





R2 0.561 0.565 0.603 0.600
Obs 2580 2580 2580 2580 2528
Standard errors are in parenthesis, p-values in brackets. Standard errors are robust correcting
for heterogeneity. Idiosyncratic risk (Risk) is the dependent variable for all models. Disclosure’s
significance is based on one-tailed test. Hansen J-test (H-J) reports the instrument validity.
AR(1) and AR(2) show the first and second order auto-correlation respectively. The number of
instruments (Instr) is reported. All variables listed are defined in Table 2. ***,**,* significance
level at 1%, 5%, 10%.
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Table 6: Quantile regressions for Idiosyncratic Risk
τ 0.05 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.95
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Disc -0.0135 -0.0241** -0.0264*** -0.0510*** -0.0770***
(0.00995) (0.0102) (0.00813) (0.0170) (0.0254)
Z -0.0858 -0.112 -0.0847 -0.0333 -0.0506
(0.0678) (0.109) (0.0639) (0.0724) (0.0953)
Lev 0.0000449 0.000199 0.000340** 0.0000607 0.000637
(0.000384) (0.000218) (0.000171) (0.000204) (0.000649)
Inta -1.707** -3.225*** -2.847*** -3.419*** -2.192
(0.669) (0.834) (0.676) (0.974) (1.792)
Tang -0.00115 0.0262 -0.0314 -0.125 -0.528
(0.0498) (0.0848) (0.0616) (0.0785) (0.551)
ROA -0.164*** -0.224*** -0.310*** -0.421*** -0.637***
(0.0447) (0.0477) (0.0333) (0.0406) (0.0902)
LogTA -0.901*** -1.026*** -1.048*** -1.113*** -1.848***
(0.104) (0.128) (0.104) (0.182) (0.371)
Growth 0.00598 0.00349 0.00599** 0.00584 0.00806
(0.00372) (0.00259) (0.00285) (0.00532) (0.0111)
Liq 1.006*** 1.093*** 1.488*** 1.580*** 2.539***
(0.231) (0.343) (0.253) (0.261) (0.912)
Cons 23.68*** 30.24*** 32.89*** 35.78*** 50.89***
(1.321) (1.508) (1.514) (2.224) (8.669)
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.312 0.347 0.379 0.41 0.411
Obs 2580 2580 2580 2580 2580
Significance based on bootstrap standard errors (1000 replications). Idiosyncratic risk (Risk)
is the dependent variable for all models. Disclosure’s significance is based on one-tailed test.
τ denotes the different quantiles. All variables listed are defined in Table 2. Equality test of
the environmental disclosure coefficients reports p-value = 0.042 [F(4, 2537)= 2.48]. ***,**,*
significance level at 1%, 5%, 10%.
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Table 7: Robustness checks I. Full-sample
Random effects Sys-GMM Quantile(.50)
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b)





Disc -0.0650*** -0.0674** -0.0831** -0.0384 -0.0326*** -0.0361*
(0.0249) (0.0282) (0.0365) (0.0519) (0.0117) (0.0188)
Z -0.904*** -0.863*** -0.604* -0.356 -0.759*** -0.663***
(0.211) (0.217) (0.310) (0.310) (0.171) (0.179)
Lev 0.0002 0.00025 -0.00005 -0.00025 0.0001 -0.00005
(0.00016) (0.00017) (0.00008) (0.00015) (0.00013) (0.0002)
R&D 0.0354 0.1289 -0.200 0.827 -0.0071 0.141
(0.269) (0.297) (0.689) (0.720) (0.104) (0.192)
Tang 0.335*** 0.350*** 0.188 0.057 0.320** 0.313**
(0.118) (0.123) (0.147) (0.158) (0.142) (0.153)
Q -1.278** -0.646 -1.935** -3.255*** -0.812** -0.945
(0.563) (0.634) (0.859) (1.05) (0.398) (0.576)
LogTA -1.793*** -1.063** -0.651 -1.579*** -1.459*** -0.814***
(0.379) (0.448) (0.928) (0.569) (0.167) (0.290)
Growth -0.0107 -0.00845 -0.0059 0.00288 -0.0127 -0.0038
(0.0231) (0.0195) (0.0183) (0.0212) (0.0112) (0.011)
Liq 0.258 0.265 -0.184 0.387 1.219* 1.591**
(0.201) (0.227) (0.203) (0.65) (0.952) (0.712)
Cons 45.92*** 36.78*** 39.40*** 16.64 39.82*** 31.53***
(3.88) (4.33) (12.36) (13.86) (2.63) (3.66)
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes





R2 0.597 0.682 0.386 0.424
Obs 1708 1708 1668 1668 1708 1708
Standard errors are in parenthesis, p-values in brackets. Standard errors are robust correcting for
heterogeneity. Disclosure’s significance is based on one-tailed test. Hansen J-test (H-J) reports
the instrument validity. AR(1) and AR(2) show the first and second order auto-correlation
respectively. The number of instruments (Instr) is reported. All variables listed are defined
in Table 2. ***,**,* significance level at 1%, 5%, 10%. Column 2, which reports Sys-GMM
estimations, does not use country dummies because the over-identifying restrictions were not
valid.
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Table 8: Robustness checks II. Sub-sample without British firms.
Random effects Sys-GMM Quantile(.50)
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b)





Disc -0.0750*** -0.0638** -0.0526*** -0.0204 -0.0461*** -0.0265
(0.0270) (0.0320) (0.0162) (0.0321) (0.0161) (0.0180)
Z -0.982*** -0.962*** -0.375 -0.309 -0.759*** -0.873***
(0.280) (0.293) (0.292) (0.285) (0.200) (0.194)
Lev 0.00211 0.00273 0.00275 0.00382 0.000477 0.00133*
(0.00312) (0.00326) (0.00297) (0.00237) (0.00118) (0.000736)
R&D 0.432 0.486 0.253 0.315 0.457*** 0.620***
(0.307) (0.332) (0.184) (0.213) (0.141) (0.204)
Tang 0.365** 0.403** 0.126 0.128 0.334** 0.411**
(0.156) (0.163) (0.145) (0.143) (0.133) (0.165)
Q -1.486** -0.802 -1.078** -1.559*** -1.308*** -1.412**
(0.658) (0.714) (0.505) (0.546) (0.486) (0.556)
LogTA -2.224*** -1.432*** -0.967*** -0.904** -2.020*** -1.643***
(0.450) (0.533) (0.319) (0.413) (0.283) (0.338)
Growth -0.0301* -0.0244 -0.0160 -0.00432 -0.0183 0.00003
(0.0156) (0.0163) (0.0164) (0.0186) (0.0169) (0.0177)
Liq 0.843 1.046 0.612 0.634 1.285** 2.058***
(0.621) (0.701) (0.500) (0.660) (0.513) (0.599)
Cons 45.40*** 40.48*** 26.15*** 26.70*** 40.87*** 35.74***
(4.58) (5.14) (4.24) (5.69) (2.35) (3.56)
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes





R2 0.602 0.684 0.398 0.439
Obs 1325 1325 1291 1291 1325 1325
Standard errors are in parenthesis, p-values in brackets. Standard errors are robust correcting for
heterogeneity. Disclosure’s significance is based on one-tailed test. Hansen J-test (H-J) reports
the instrument validity. AR(1) and AR(2) show the first and second order auto-correlation
respectively. The number of instruments (Instr) is reported. All variables listed are defined in
Table 2. ***,**,* significance level at 1%, 5%, 10%.
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Figure 1: Environmental disclosure on Risk distribution
The grey area corresponds to confidence intervals calculated with 1,000 bootstrap replications.
The dash line represents the OLS estimations with its confidence intervals (dot lines). The
control variables are not reported for brevity but are available upon request.
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Appendix
Advised by the study of Qiu et al. (2016), Bloomberg environmental disclosure has
been constructed by 60 different items that have been retrieved by annual reports,
sustainability reports and company websites. The overall score is standardized by
industry. The 60 environmental items are not equally weighted, items appeared in
the top of Table 9 receive relatively higher weights than items in the bottom. So,
the score captures both the quantity and quality of the disclosures.
Table 9: Environmental disclosure items
# #
1 Direct CO2 Emissions 31 Paper Recycled
2 Indirect CO2 Emissions 32 Fuel Used (Th Litres)
3 Travel Emissions 33 Raw Materials Used
4 Total CO2 Emissions 34 % Recycled Materials
5 CO2 Intensity (Tonnes) 35 Gas Flaring
6 CO2 Intensity per Sales 36 Number of Spills
7 GHG Scope 1 37 Amount of Spills (Th Tonnes)
8 GHG Scope 2 38 Nuclear % Total Energy
9 GHG Scope 3 39 Solar % Total Energy
10 Total GHG Emissions 40 Phones Recycled
11 NOx Emissions 41 Environmental Fines #
12 SO2 Emissions 42 Environmental Fines $
13 SOx Emissions 43 ISO 14001 Certified Sites
14 VOC Emissions 44 Number of Sites
15 CO Emissions 45 % Sites Certified
16 Methane Emissions 46 Environmental Accounting Cost
17 ODS Emissions 47 Investments in Sustainability
18 Particulate Emissions 48 Energy Efficiency Policy
19 Total Energy Consumption 49 Emissions Reduction Initiatives
20 Electricity Used (MWh) 50 Environmental Supply Chain
21 Renewable Energy Use 51 Management Green
22 Water Consumption 52 Green Building Policy
23 Water/Unit of Prod (in Litres) 53 Waste Reduction Policy
24 %Water Recycled 54 Sustainable Packaging
25 Discharges to Water 55 Environmental Quality Management Policy
26 Waste Water (Th Cubic Metres) 56 Climate Change Policy
27 Hazardous Waste 57 New Products - Climate Change
28 Total Waste 58 Biodiversity Policy
29 % Waste Recycled 59 Environmental Awards Received
30 Paper Consumption 60 Verification Type
These 60 items should not be strictly disclosed by every firm. For instance, the item “Phones
Recycled” is only relevant for telecommunications industry and so firms from different industries
are not penalized for not disclosing it.
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